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  3“Thus there is an inherent conﬂict between two goals. The ideals of democracy
and equality require as proportional representation as possible while eﬃcient gov-
ernment often requires less proportional representation” (Laakso and Taagepera
(1981), p. 107).
1 Introduction
Electoral systems diﬀer in government eﬃciency and representativeness. Repres-
entativeness, is the system capability to produce laws in line with voters’ will. A
system is perfectly representative if parties’ power is proportional to their share of
votes. Eﬃciency is the capability to produce well structured and coherent laws,
wasting as few resources as possible. Eﬃciency is beyond the scope of this work;
I focus on representativeness, measuring the diﬀerence between party’s power and
share of votes under diﬀerent voting rules.
The link between voters’ preferences and the legislative outcome is extremely
complex. Under proportional rule, Parliament’s composition perfectly reﬂects
parties’ shares of vote. Common wisdom suggests that, better reﬂecting voters’
preferences, proportional systems are the most equitable.1 A main drawback of the
proportional rule is the greater instability and the increase in the laws production
time, compared with majority voting systems.2 From 2006 to 2008, Mr. Prodi
led the Italian government; a small pivotal party succeeded in heavily inﬂuencing
his activity; I shows that common wisdom is misleading: plurality rule, at times,
better reﬂects voters’ preferences.
Two ﬁlters possibly intervene (see Figure 1): the electoral system (ﬁlter 1)
and the coalition formation (ﬁlter 2). Any but the proportional rule implies a
distortion in Parliament composition. The coalition formation process also pro-
duces distortions: some parties are excluded from the government; in addition,
the distribution of power amongst parties diﬀers from the distribution of seats
in Parliament, because of parties’ bargaining power and pivotal position. The
two distortions determine voters’ total misrepresentation of preferences. When of
opposite sign, the two distortions compensate, possibly cancelling out.
Several papers were devoted to each distortion separately,3 I analyse the whole
electoral process, from elections to government formation. Within the (possibly
inﬁnite) set of electoral rules, I restrict my attention to purely proportional and
1See, for instance, Douglas (1923).
2See Laakso and Taagepera (1981), Nurmi (1981) and Schoﬁeld (1981).
3Besides the well known paper from Taagepera and Shugart (1989), Morelli (2004) and
Kestelman (1999) oﬀer a clear and succinct review of the literature on electoral rules’ distor-
tions. Instead, Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005) and
Kalandrakis (2006) study some properties of the coalition formation game.
4Figure 1: The government formation process
plurality rules, which inspired most western democracies. I compute the misrep-
resentation of voters’ preferences, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between parties’ power
and received share of votes. I derive the conditions under which a rule reﬂects
citizens’ preferences better than another.
I ﬁnd that small parties’ political power is more than proportional to their
seats share, due to their pivotal position. The distortion in favour of small parties
decreases if parties are impatient to form a coalition to rule the country. The
distribution of seats under plurality rule is favourable to big parties. Pushing in
opposite directions, the distortions compensate; when their magnitude is similar,
voters’ preferences are better represented under plurality rule. I conclude that
majority voting is preferable when parties are patient, while proportional rule is
more adequate when parties are impatient.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 illustrates results and discusses the
consequences of relaxing some assumptions. Section 4 illustrates the model using
2006 and 2008 Italian elections datas. The last section concludes.
2 The model
The political process starts with the elections, negotiations occur once the distri-
bution of seats in Parliament is known. Parties try to form a coalition controlling
the majority of seats; when they succeed, they share the power. The government
can rule the country if supported by a majority: at any time, the share of power
must satisfy parties’ participation constraint.
5Parties in the winning coalition derive oﬃce and ideological beneﬁts.4 Forming
a coalition means to agree on the political program and the share of economic
beneﬁts. For expositional convenience, I consider that the winning coalition shares
a budget and self-interested parties only care about their share.5
Shares depend on bargaining power; they are the outcome of an either cooper-
ative or non-cooperative game. Cooperative coalition theory suits if players form
the grand coalition, maximise total joint proﬁt, and share beneﬁts according to
a value.6 Non-cooperative theory suits when players maximise own payoﬀs given
others’ best response. This usually occurs if some agents ﬁnd it convenient to
deviate from the cooperative equilibrium. For parties, belonging to the govern-
ment is necessary to obtain a positive payoﬀ; if a coalition controls the majority
of seats, there is no interest in enlarging it. It is reasonable to expect that parties
act non-cooperatively.
Coalition formation starts choosing a party, called ‘formateur’, in charge of
leading negotiations.7 If a single party controls the majority of seats, it rules the
country alone. The way a formateur is chosen is usually not determined by the
constitution. Bigger parties have larger probabilities of being selected. Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) propose alternative ways of
attaching parties the probability of being formateur. Austen-Smith and Banks
(1988) suppose that parties’ shares determine the probability of being a successful
formateur; the largest party is chosen ﬁrst, in case of failure, the second largest
is chosen and so forth. Instead, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) directly attach to
parties a probability of being a successful formateur equal to their seats shares.
When the formateur is successful, it always belongs to the winning coalition. The
two procedures give similar results; I follow Baron and Ferejohn (1989)’s approach
that, common in the theoretical literature,8 performs well in empirical tests.9
I consider a country with 3 parties and 3 groups of homogeneous citizens in-
dexed by i; ci denotes groups’ relative size, i.e., the proportion of votes of a party;
4Ideological beneﬁts are the right to implement the preferred policy. Oﬃce beneﬁts are
direct and indirect monetary beneﬁts including, for instance, the possibility to choose public
expenditure in strategic sectors. Some papers concentrate on oﬃce (e.g., Riker (1962) or Baron
and Ferejohn (1989)) or ideological (e.g., Schoﬁeld (1986)) beneﬁts. Austen-Smith and Banks
(1990) analyse both separately, assuming they are orthogonal. In Sened (1996) the two elements
are really amalgamated.
5Alternatively, think a) of orthogonal projects to ﬁnance, with each party interested in one,
or b) that parties ﬁx the time devoted to law proposals, with power representing the capability
to pursue owns’ agenda.
6A value is a function allocating payoﬀs in a unique way and respecting some required axioms.
The Shapley (1953) and Owen (1977, 1981) value are the most well known. They assign players a
power proportional to the expected value of their marginal contributions to all possible coalitions.
7For a detailed explanation of the role of the formateur and how it is chosen see Diermeier
and Merlo (2004).
8See Baron and Diermeier (2001) or Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2007).
9See Diermeier and Merlo (2004).
6c1 + c2 + c3 = 1. Without loss of generality, I order groups by their size, thus
1 > c1 ≥ c2 ≥ c3 > 0. I assume the number of parties to remain unchanged
when the electoral rule changes; I do not consider ideological restrictions during
the coalition formation.10 Party i’s political program maximises the utility voters
in group i. Vector e = (e1,e2,e3) denotes parties’ share of seats. An electoral
system is seen as a function F transforming parties’ share of votes into shares of
seats, i.e., e = F(c). I focus on two systems: proportional and majority voting
(also called “plurality rule”).11
Assumption 1 (No standing-alone) No party ever obtains the majority of seats:
thus, e1 < 0.5 and, a fortiori, c1 < 0.5.12
The grey area in Figure 2 shows the possible combinations of e2 and e3 respect-
ing the ordering 0.5 > e1 ≥ e2 ≥ e3 > 0.
Figure 2: Possible combinations of e2 and e3.
Assumption 2 (Constant coalition value) The amount of resources to alloc-
ate is constant. The bargaining issue boils down to the “sharing a dollar” problem,
where each party (and its voters) is only interested in its share of total budget.
When no party secures a majority, the bargaining phase begins. A coalition
S is the result of an agreement between two parties on how to share the budget.





zi is the budget share of party i. Agents’ utility, linear in zi, is independent of
zj (i.e., Ui(z) = zi). A winning coalition has to be supported by at least half of
Parliamentarians. D ⊆ 2{1,2,3} is the set of all possible winning coalitions. With
10Fixing the number of parties is as a short term assumption. Ideological restrictions are not
an issue; the model can be interpreted as the process occurring when ideologically close parties
are negotiating. The exclusion of a party can be reproduced by rescaling seats shares.
11Under a proportional rule, parties’ share of seats equals the share of votes received, i.e.,
ei = ci. Under plurality rule, the country is divided into Q districts (one for available seat); in
each district, the candidate receiving more votes wins: ei =
Qi(c)
Q , where Qi(c) is the number of
districts in which party i secured the relative majority of vote casts.
12Since non proportional electoral rules favour big parties, c1 > 0.5 would imply e1 ≥ 0.5.
7three parties, D does not depend on e: any pair of parties can secure a majority.
Given the asymmetry among parties implied by the special role of the formateur,
coalitions (i,j) and (j,i) are diﬀerent; henceforth, the ﬁrst element in a coalition
denotes the formateur.
At time t = 0 a party, called formateur, is randomly chosen. The formateur
should form a coalition S ∈ D; it proposes a vector z which should be approved
by the parties in S.13 If z is accepted by S the game ends: the government is
formed and the budget is shared according to z. Otherwise, in the next period
a formateur (possibly the same one) is randomly chosen and the game continues
until an agreement is reached. I use the notation z
j
i to indicate the ith element of
vector z when j is the formateur.
Assumption 3 (Recognition probability) As in Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
the recognition probability πi of being a successful formateur equals party i’s share
of seats (i.e., πi = ei).
To model the bargaining game, I follow Kalandrakis (2006) and Snyder Jr.,
Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005), both considering a game ` a la Rubinstein-St˚ ahl
(Rubinstein (1982)). The continuation value, v, is deﬁned as the vector of the next
period expected utility of parties. I only focus on stationary proposal strategies
involving no delay: in each period a party behaves the same way when formateur
and proposes a share vector such that, without delay, all parties belonging to the
proposed coalition accept.
Assumption 4 Parties discount the future (they care about the time needed, after
the elections, to form a government). The patient rate, δ < 1, is the same for all
parties.14
The utility in time t of a share zi in period t + k is given by Ui(z,k) = δkzi;




is the discounted expected utility of i, conditional on forming a coalition in the
subsequent period; the uncertainty concerns the formateur’s identity: the value of
v depends on recognition probabilities.
Given the vector of seats shares e and the time discount factor δ, a game is
denoted by Γ(δ,e). When an agent is formateur, its action consists in proposing
a division zi ∈ Z of the budget, the others’ action space consists in accepting
the formateur’s proposal or not. A no-delay, Stationary, Subgame Perfect, Pure
Strategy (SSPPS) equilibrium for game Γ(δ,e) is a set zi of stationary strategies
13To have a winning coalition, all parties in S should obtain a positive share. There is no
reason to leave a positive share to parties outside the coalition.
14This is a simplifying assumption, allowing to have a lighter notation and simpler computa-
tions. Actually, results depend only on the smallest party’s δ.
8and of acceptance strategies. A SSPPS equilibrium requires the share of all parties
in the coalition to be such that zi ≥ vi;15 existence of SSPPS Nash equilibrium
is not an issue for game Γ(δ,e) by the arguments of Banks and Duggan (2000).
Other equilibria may exist; I focus on the stationary ones in pure strategy.
Voter preferences. Preferences cannot be directly observed, people’s vote
can. If voters act strategically, we cannot deduce their preferences from their vote;
a change in the electoral system may aﬀect the voting strategy. I assume sincere
voting; this event is not empirically irrelevant: for instance, Hooghe, Maddens,
and Noppe (2006) found empirical evidence that after the last voting rule change
in Belgium there were no signiﬁcant changes in aggregate voters’ behaviour, they
interpreted it as a signal of myopic/sincere voting. Some arguments can justify
voters’ myopic behaviour under majority voting, for instance, parties’ policy vec-
tors can be orthogonal or suﬃciently diﬀerent for a voter not to consider two
parties as substitutes. Furthermore, it is costly to be informed about politics (pro-
grammes, performances, the electoral system, other voters’ expected behaviour)
and voters may prefer to vote sincerely. Assuming sincere voting allows inferring
voters’ preferences from votes.
Measuring misrepresentation. The model goal is to relate voters’ pref-
erences to government policies.16 Given voters’ choice, I determine the winning
coalition and compute parties’ shares. I measure misrepresentation through My,
where y = {PR;MV } denotes the electoral system, with PR=proportional rule
and MV=majority voting and compare rules’ representativeness.
The electoral system determines the number of seats a party controls, thus, it
aﬀects the probability at which a coalition forms and parties’ budget shares. Let













represents the Euclidean distance between parties’ expected budget share and the
optimal one. i.e., Equation 1 computes the distance between parties’ expected
power (discounted for the probability of forming each possible coalition) and their
share of votes, ci.
Equation 1 takes large values when parties are either under or over-represented.
Over-representation occurs when a party, being pivotal for a coalition, obtains a
larger share of beneﬁts than the share of population it represents.
To compute My, both ci and ei are necessary.17 The relation between ci and ei
15For more details on that, see Kalandrakis (2006), p. 444.
16Policies are interpreted as parties’ resources, which are proportional to parties’ power/share
zi.
17To compute Pr(S)   zS
i , ei is required.
9depends on the electoral system. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) show that, prop-
erly choosing parameter τ, every electoral system can be approximated through




j . For the proportional rule, τ = 1 and ci = ei.
Under plurality rule, the share of seats depends on the geographical distribution
of voters’ preferences over districts; for plurality single-member district systems
and a normal population, it is usually considered that τ ≈ 3 (Qualter (1968)),
from which the name ‘cube rule’.18 According to Taagepera and Shugart (1989),
τ = 2.5 better suits modern western societies with plurality single-member district
systems, while τ = 8 would be a better approximation for the USA actual system.
In the literature, the original cube rule (with τ = 3) is usually assumed to be a
good approximation for the two party case and also to ﬁt data for the three party
case; the precision of this measure falls when the number of parties increases.
Assumption 5 (Cube rule) To compute the share of seats of a party under ma-
jority voting, I assume that we observe the aggregate number of votes for each party











































In this section, after deriving parties’ power share, I compute voters’ misrepresent-
ation (Equation 1) under proportional and plurality rule. I show that the distortion
under the former is larger than under the latter when δ is large enough.
A coalition of two out of three parties can always secure a majority. The form-
ateur compares its utility in each possible coalition to choose the other member.
Ex ante, eight scenarios may occur, depending on the identity of the formateur.
Proposition 1 (Sharing rule) In equilibrium, coalitions always include only two
parties. Formateur i proposes to party j its continuation value vj, and zero
18J. P. Smith formulated this relation in 1909, in a report to the British Royal Commission on
electoral systems. Duverger (1954) developed and made it famous. For a discussion on it and its
drawbacks, see Riker (1982), Blau (2001) or Rogowski and Kayser (2002).
19All the results can be replicated with diﬀerent values of τ, to ﬁt a given country’s electoral
system and geographical distribution of preferences among voters. Section 4.1 discusses on that.















. Party x, excluded from the coalition, receives 0;
party j obtains the present value of what it would get (in discounted expected terms)
in the next period.
Proof. There is no reason to form a coalition with more than one party, since the
value of a coalition is constant and 2 parties are suﬃcient to control the majority
of seats. The formateur, being residual claimant, minimises party j’s share (zj),
proposing the minimum value that a party would accept. The cheapest price that





j ). From zi












Proposition 2 (Minimal winning coalition) In the SSPPS equilibrium, the
formateur always forms a coalition with the smallest other party.20 The ex-ante
unique equilibrium coalitions are {(1,3),(2,3),(3,2)}, where the ﬁrst element of a
pair denotes the formateur. Equilibrium shares depend on the formateur: a priori,
zi
j  = z
j
i.
Proof. In the appendix.
Corollary 2.1 (Probability of forming a coalition) From Assumption 3 on
recognition probabilities, the probability Pr(S) of coalition S = (i,j) is: Pr(1,3) =
e1, Pr(2,3) = e2 and Pr(3,2) = e3.
























Table 1: The equilibrium vectors z.
Proposition 2 means that small parties are “cheaper”; the formateur prefers
them to form a coalition. From Table 1, the discount factor δ plays a key role in
the budget share. The formateur is residual claimant: it pays to partners their
continuation value, which is increasing in patience.
In Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005), players’ equilibrium shares are
all the same, because the authors solve for one of the mixed strategies equilibria
20This result is in line with the empirical evidence that parties tend to form minimal winning
coalitions, to reduce coordination costs and increase eﬃciency. Theoretical (i.e., Riker (1962))
and empirical (i.e., Martin and Stevenson (2001)) studies conﬁrm it.
11(players compete on zi, to belong to the winning coalition; the formateur can
extract more surplus from them). In my model, a priori, shares are diﬀerent for
each party. When δ is close to one (parties are patient), the formateur is forced
to let almost all the share to the other party.
Figure 3: Coalitional space Z
Figure 3 shows feasible combinations of budget share amongst 3 parties. Each
axe represents one party’s share of votes and of budget. The simplex dark side
is set Z; points A and B are examples of budget shares for (1,3) and for (2,3).
Point C is an example of an optimal point.21 Points A and B depend on δ, point
C does not; the larger δ, the further A and B are from the formateur’s axe. By
Proposition 1, the equilibrium share always lies on a vertex (one party receives 0).
Using Table 1 in Equation 1, I compute voters’ misrepresentation under the
proportional (MPR) and plurality (MMV) rule. Equation 1 becomes:





(1 − δ)(1 − δe3)
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1 − δ + δ2e1e3
+ e3
(1 − δ)δe2





(e1 + e2)(1 − δe2 − δe3)δe3
1 − δ + δ2e1e3
+
e3 (1 − δ)(1 − δe2) + δ2e1e3




where each of the three main elements in the expression is a function of the dis-
tances between a party share of votes and its power.












1 ((δc1 − 1 − δ)c3 − 2)
2 + (δc2c3 (2 + δc1 − 2δ))
2￿0.5
.
Using the cube rule (Assumption 5) to obtain the relation between ci and ei, under

































































i and x = (1 − δ)σ2 + c3
1c3
3δ2.
The diﬀerence in misrepresentation between the two electoral systems, denoted
MM = MPR − MMV, is:
MM =
1








1 ((δc1 − 1 − δ)c3 − 2)




















































13MM > 0 means that the diﬀerence between parties’ expected and optimal
share is larger under proportional than plurality rule; when Equation 6 is posit-
ive, plurality rule better represents voters’ preferences (i.e., each party’s expected
budget share is closer to its share of votes).
Proposition 3 (Role of the discount factor) Regardless of the distribution of
seats among parties, two thresholds exist (δ ≈ 0.108, ¯ δ ≈ 0.780) for the discount
factor such that: a) majority voting is preferable when δ > ¯ δ, and b) proportional
rule is preferable when δ < δ. When the value of δ is within the two thresholds,
parties’ relative share of seats determines which voting system is preferable.
Proof. Solving for δ, plurality rule is preferable if and only if MM > 0; the
inequality can only be solved numerically. Figure 4 describes the behaviour of
Equation 6, showing its shape for six values of δ. The horizontal axe depicts party
3 seats share (e3), while e2 is on the depth axe. The dark surface corresponds to
the zero plan; the light surface depicts Equation 6. Given δ and the combinations
of seat shares, the light surface is above the dark one if the majority voting is
preferable. For instance, for δ = 0.78 and δ = 0.98, the light surface is above the
dark one regardless of the distribution of seats among parties.
Figure 4: The impact of δ
Proposition 3 states that either system is always preferred outside the interval
(0.108,0.780); within it, the relative share of seats determines which system is
preferred. After elections a coalition forms: the budget share the formateur lets to
its partner equals partner’s continuation value. When δ is small enough (parties
are impatient), it is cheap to persuade a partner: indeed, when δ tends to 0, the
formateur’s share tends to one and parties’ expected utility tends to their share of
14seats; than, the best electoral system is such that ci = ei, i.e., it is the proportional
one.22 Since ﬁlter 2 (Figure 1) disappears for δ going to zero, there is no reason to
distort the mechanism at ﬁlter-one level.
The share the formateur has to leave equals its partner’s discounted expected
earning. When δ gets larger (parties are patient), a distortion appears at ﬁlter two
level: the formateur has to leave to its partner a larger portion of future earnings;
small parties’ expected share becomes greater than their share of received votes.
Plurality rule distorts election results in the opposite direction (reducing small
parties share of seats); when δ is large enough (δ > 0.78), ﬁlter two distortion
is large and the majority rule desirable. When δ ∈ (0.108,0.78), small parties’
bargaining power is limited: according to parties’ relative seats share, plurality
rule distortion may be larger than what necessary to counter-balance the coalition
formation distortion (i.e., the distortion at ﬁlter 1 level induced by plurality rule is
too large compared to the one at ﬁlter 2 level). For δ ∈ (0.108,0.78) and c3 close
to zero the proportional rule is preferable while, for c3 and c2 big enough, majority
voting is better than proportional rule.
3.1 Relaxing some assumptions
This subsection is meant to brieﬂy discuss the impact of some assumptions. Lim-
iting parties to 3 allows to obtain closed form results. It is possible to solve the
model for n > 3 parties, but additional restrictions should be introduced. Firstly,
it would be necessary to model formateur’s trade-oﬀ between increasing the num-
ber of parties and forming a coalition including larger parties. Proposition 2 may
not hold: forming a coalition with the smallest party may be not enough to secure
the majority. According to the kind of coalition that is formed, the thresholds for
δ would change but qualitatively results would be the same.
Relaxing Assumption 1 can lead to two scenarios: if a party controls the ma-
jority of seats regardless of the electoral system, all rules are equally representative
of voters’ preferences. Additional, non trivial, analysis is required for the case in
which one party controls the majority alone only under one regime.
If (contrary to Assumption 2) the coalition’s value depends on the identity of
partners (e.g., because of ideological aﬃnities), coalition formation would integrate
this. The same considerations as for the number of parties would hold. I excluded
this case, because results would be assumption driven. As mentioned, having total
incompatibility between two parties is equivalent to consider the model with n−1
22From an analytical point of view: δ → 0 implies zi
j → 0, thus zi
i → 1 and EUi(zS
i ,0) = P
h∈D πhzh
i → πi. Since πi = ei, to minimise the diﬀerence between the share of votes (ci) and
the expected share of budget for a party (EUi(zS
i ,0)) we need ei = ci, which is the case under
the proportional electoral system.
15parties.
Concerning the common value of δ (Assumption 4), the discount factor of the
non-formateur party determines parties’ share; all results can be extended, repla-
cing δ by the discount factor of the non-formateur party in the winning coalition.
The value of δ must always be strictly smaller than 1 to ensure that the solution
of the problem exists and is unique.
Section 4.1 discusses the role of Assumption 5. In particular, it explains the
role of τ and how results change for τ < 3.
4 A model illustration with Italian elections’ data
In Italy, over the two last legislatures, the smallest parties in the winning coalitions
had very much power compared to their seats share in Parliament. In this section
I use Italian elections results to clarify the model.23
Italian Parliament has two houses: the lower house and the Senate. All adults
(older than 18 years old) can vote for the former, citizens aged more than 25 can
vote for both. The current electoral law allows for regional speciﬁc rules for each
house. Over 20 regions, in 18 (19 for the congress) the electoral law is based on the
proportional principle. For my computations, I used parties number of received
votes, in order to disregard local speciﬁcities.
In 2006 a centre-left coalition elected Romano Prodi prime minister. The win-
ning coalition oﬃcially included eight parties at the Senate; most of them were
created ad hoc before the election, to proﬁt of some exotic features of the elect-
oral law, only few of them had an own leader and a programme independent from
the main party’s. I focus on a small independent party: UDEUR. It represented
about 1% of citizens on a national basis, it was pivotal and, when in 2008 it left
the coalition, the government lost the majority, new elections were called.
Coalition members were aware of the consequences of this party leaving: the
majority controlled three more senators than the opposite coalition, including the
external support received by some “senatori a vita”24. During the last months
of Mr. Prodi’s government, UDEUR’s senators used their inﬂuence on medias
and their pivotal positions (threatening to leave) to obtain some major changes in
several laws, especially in the “Finanziaria”.25 They carried on their own agenda
and clearly showed that their real power within the coalition was more than 1%.
23Election results are public, they can be found on the web page of the Ministero degli interni,
on the web page of each of the two houses of Parliament, and on many independent web pages.
24“Senatori a vita” are senators who are not elected (e.g., former Republic Presidents). They
sit in Parliament for life.
25The “Legge Finanziaria” is one of the most important Italian laws, it determines the forth-
coming year public expenditure.
16In what follows, I consider the left and the right coalitions as two single parties
(named CL and CR) and UDEUR as a third independent party that can form a
coalition with either party.26 Table 2 ﬁrst column summarises the 2006 Senate seats
shares under proportional rule. The second column is the “cube rule” estimation
of the share of seats under plurality rule.




Table 2: Seats Share - 2006 Italian Senate
Figure 5: Budget share depending on δ
The budget share depends on the discount factor: Picture 5 depicts the equi-
librium share of each party for diﬀerent levels of δ. The straight line is for the
majority voting rule; the dotted one, for the proportional one; the dashed one
represents parties’ shares of votes; each chart corresponds to one party: (from top
left) CR, CL and UDEUR. Under plurality rule, both CR and CL’s shares increase
at the expenses of UDEUR, which share is extremely large under the proportional
rule, if the discount factor gets larger (e.g., for δ = 0.99, under proportional rep-
resentation its expected share is 33%, while under plurality rule it is 0.02%).
26This would have been politically plausible; UDEUR is a centre party, its leader already
formed some coalitions with the centre-right party and he run with it at the 2009 European
Parliament elections.
17Equation 1 measures the Euclidean distance between a party’s average power
and the optimal one, given voters preferences; the larger its value, the bigger is
the diﬀerence between the distribution of power within the government and voters’
preferences. With the 2006 election’s data, the diﬀerence in misrepresentation
(MM, Equation 6) is drawn in Figure 6 as a function of δ. For δ > 66.7%,
plurality rule ensures a better representation of voters; the opposite is true for
δ < 66.7%.
Figure 6: Misrepresentation as a function of δ
After the 2008 elections, due to a change in the political strategy of the two
main parties, only four parties are now represented in Parliament: PD-IDV (the
centre-left party),27 PDL (the centre-right party), Lega Nord and UDC, the smal-
lest party.28 Table 3summarises their shares.
Seats - Proportional Rule Seats - Plurality Rule
PD-IDV 41.7% 49.8%
PDL 41.5% 49.2%
Lega Nord 10.5% 0.8%
UDC 6.2% 0.2%
Table 3: Seats Share - 2008 Italian Congress
UDC did not obtain enough seats to form a two party coalition and resulted to
be a “dummy player”, that is: regardless of the coalition, its contribution is always
irrelevant, thus it never belongs to a winning coalition. The successful coalition
was the centre-right one (PDL with Lega Nord), and Mr. Berlusconi was elected
prime minister. Lega Nord has already proved that it is not willing to accept the
coalition’s decisions without negotiating. PDL already withdrew more than once
27PD and IDV, through a pre-electoral agreement, run together and shared both programme
and candidate prime minister.
28To be more precise, one more party (SVP) is represented. SVP is a local party from a
cross-border region, where the majority of citizens speaks German. Aimed to protect linguistic
minorities, a special electoral rule allowed SVP to obtain 2 seats at Parliament (equivalent to
0.3%).
18own law proposals not in line with Lega Nord’s program, and promoted others,
against the will of most of the parliament (including several PDL leaders).29
Figure 7: Budget share depending on δ
Figure 7 shows the share of budget of each party, according to the value of δ for
PD, PDL and Lega Nord. Under the proportional rule, Lega Nord obtains a share
of budget considerably larger than the share of votes received (e.g., with a share
of votes of 10.5% and for δ = 80% the expected share of budget for Lega Nord
is 26.8%, while under majority voting it would be 2.5%). Considering aggregate
data and the level of misrepresentation computed by Equation 6, Figure 8 shows
that, for δ ≥ 64.64% the majoritarian rule is preferable to the proportional one.
Figure 8: Misrepresentation as a function of δ
29For instance, in April 2009 Lega Nord, by threatening to leave the coalition, obtained from
Mr. Berlusconi’s party to change the day of a referendum, at an estimated cost of 400 million
euros.
194.1 Comments on the cube rule
I assumed the cube rule to hold with τ = 3. Although empirically tested, the
cube rule lacks of theoretical foundations. The real share of seats depends on
the distribution of preferences over districts.30 For some countries, τ = 3 may
be a poor proxy; diﬀerent values for τ account for idiosyncratic diﬀerences in the
electoral system, the distribution of voter preferences, etc.31
Figure 9: Changes both in δ and τ
Let’s see how previous results change in δ and τ. In the 2006 case, we have two
big parties and one very small; in the 2008 case, the smallest party is relatively big.
Figure 9 shows how the misrepresentation index changes over δ and τ. Whatever
the value for τ, non proportional voting systems perform better if parties are
patient.
For low levels of δ, non proportional systems perform better only when the
value of τ is small. In Figure 10 we can see that the peak is close to one for low
levels of δ (each line corresponds to a diﬀerent level of δ, lower lines are for lower
values of δ). When the smallest party is very small, the majoritarian rule might
30For instance, in a country where, in all districts, parties’ shares are (40%,30%,30%), un-
der plurality rule the ﬁrst party obtains 100% of seats, while the cube rule predicts a share
(54%,23%,23%).
31As a general rule, we should expect τ to be larger in a country with one big party many
small local parties, while τ should be smaller than 3 for countries with heterogeneous districts,
strong local parties and no big national parties.
20Figure 10: Eﬀect of τ for diﬀerent levels of δ
distort too much and a small value for τ would be preferable (this can be obtained
artiﬁcially, with a mixed electoral rule, or it can simply be a consequence of the
geographical distribution of preferences). On the opposite, when the smallest party
obtains a large share of votes, the majority voting distortion is smaller and it is
preferable to have a τ closer to three.
Figure 11: Eﬀect of δ for diﬀerent levels of τ
Figure 11 shows how the level of misrepresentation changes with δ for diﬀerent
levels of τ. The value of δ for which proportional and majority voting rule are
equivalent is an increasing function of τ: the smaller the value of τ, the more it is
likely that the introduction of distortions in favour of large parties is beneﬁcial.
5 Conclusions
Electoral systems are a social compromise. Each country chooses its voting rules
according to political, cultural, historical and social reasons. Many countries (e.g.,
Italy), preferred the proportional systems while others (e.g., U.K. or U.S.A.) chose
the plurality rule. Most countries adapted their system according to local needs.
My work focused on the two basic electoral systems (i.e., purely proportional versus
21plurality rule) disregarding local speciﬁcities.
Proportional electoral rules are costly in term of governability: the number
of represented parties in the winning coalition tends to increase; governments’
expected duration falls and the average time to introduce structural changes in-
creases, because of the long negotiation time required. According to proportional
systems advocates, on the other hand, decisions reﬂect citizens’ preferences since,
by deﬁnition, Parliament’s composition reﬂects precisely voters’ preferences.
It is generally disregarded that decisions are mainly taken by the government
and, within the Parliament, by the majority of members. Coalitions form to sup-
port a government and parties’ power depends on their role in the coalition, not on
their shares of seats in Parliament. Given the distortion due to negotiation and the
importance of bargaining during the coalition formation stage, it results pointless
to measure the degree of representativeness of Parliament. What matters is the
relation between voters’ preferences and a party’s power within the government.
I showed that, especially when parties are patient at the coalition formation
stage, the distortion resulting from the negotiation process (ﬁlter 2) increases small
parties’ power; at the election stage (ﬁlter 1), plurality rule distorts Parliament’s
representativeness; the two distortions have opposite sign. If parties are impatient,
ﬁlter 2 distortion is negligible, thus a non-distorting electoral system is better;
when parties are patient enough, the magnitude of the distortion increases and it
is beneﬁcial to have a non-proportional electoral system. My model shows that the
idea that, under proportional rules, governments are always more representative
is false; plurality rule can be preferable from a representativeness perspective.
The Italian example is instructive: during the 15th legislature, a party rep-
resenting 1% of voters, could threaten the government, obtained to substantially
change part of the 2008 “Finanziaria” law and determined the government’s fall
the 23rd January, 2008. Similarly, during the ﬁrst year of the 16th legislature, with
about 11% of votes at the 2008 elections, a party severely aﬀected government’s
behaviour on very discussed laws, such as the law to reform the justice system, the
immigration laws and the law on federalism. With a less proportional system (for
instance under plurality rule), small parties’ role would reduce and more decisions
would be taken by parties representing a larger subset of the population.
Plurality rule may reduce by too much the smallest party’s power. Preliminary
results from section 4.1, in particular the study of misrepresentation for diﬀerent
values of τ, however suggest that proportional rule is never the most representat-
ive rule, better results can be achieved by introducing some distortions aimed to
increase the power of big parties.
22Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
The generic share of budget with three parties is resumed in table 4.32
Formateur
Shares 1 2 3
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Table 4: Generic shares with three parties
By solving the system of equations, we can (for each of the eight scenarios)
compute the continuation value for each party. For the case {(1,3), (2,3), (3,2)},
results are obtained as follows:
z
1










































3. Combining 7b with
7e and 7f with 7c, we obtain:
z
2
2 = 1 −
δe3






























32Note that, according to which coalition is formed, some of the cells in the table take the
value zero.
23After some simpliﬁcations and using the property that δe1 +δe2 + δe3 = δ, we
obtain the results summarised in table 5.
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Table 5: Shares at equilibrium
The continuation value depends on the coalition and on the identity of the
formateur. To have a stationary equilibrium, each party always chooses to form
the same coalition when it is the formateur. For stationarity, its choice must be,
at every period of time, the best response to others’ player behaviour and the
strategy has to be always the same. Committing to a given strategy allows parties
to modify their continuation value when they are not formateur.
Within the eight scenarios, we look for Nash simultaneous stationary subgame
perfect equilibria in pure strategies (SSPPS). Each player has two possible actions
(consisting in forming a coalition with either of the remaining parties). Comparing
expected payoﬀs of each party in each situation (through a reduced form game
matrix of payoﬀ), we notice that only scenario {(1,3),(2,3),(3,2)} is SSPPS. If
for example party 2 always form a coalition (2,3) and party 3 a coalition (3,2),
then for party 1 it is a best-reply strategy to form a coalition (1,3).
To check that this scenario is really an equilibrium, take the generic recognition






a(1 − δ)(1 − δc)
1 − δ + δ2ac
+ 0 + 0 (10)
v2 =0 + b
(1 − δ)(1 − δc)
1 − δ + δ2ac
+ c
(1 − δ)δb
1 − δ + δ2ac
=
b(1 − δ)
1 − δ + δ2ac
(11)
v3 =(a + b)
(1 − δb − δc)δc
1 − δ + δ2ac
+ c
(1 − δ)(1 − δb) + δ2ac
1 − δ + δ2ac
=
(1 − δc − δb)c
1 − δ + δ2ac
, (12)










For a = e1, b = e2, c = e3, and knowing that zi
j = δvj for i  = j, we are back to
results in table 5.
We check now that no player wants to deviate: we refer to an equilibrium E
via the corresponding formed coalition when a party is formateur. Let’s call E∗
the above proposed equilibrium (that is {(1,3),(2,3),(3,2)}) and deﬁne then Ei
the alternative candidate equilibrium if party i deviates.
24Since we look for stationary pure strategy equilibria, to show that no player
wants to deviate, I show that a) E∗  1 E1 = ({1,2},{2,3},{3,2}), b) E∗  2 E2 =
({1,3},{2,1},{3,2}) and c) E∗  3 E3 = ({1,3},{2,3},{3,1}).
a) E∗  1 E1 if and only if the continuation value of party 3 when the equi-
librium is E∗ is smaller than the one of party 2 in the equilibrium E1, that is iﬀ




1−δ+δ2e1e2 . Thus e3 (1 − δ + δ2e1e2) <
e2 (1 − δ + δ2e1e3). Since e3 < e2, it is clear that e3 (1 − δ) < e2 (1 − δ).





From 0.5 > e1 > e2 > e3, it is a matter of simple algebra to show that the left
hand side is always smaller than the right hand side.
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